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Abstract 
Access to infrastructure is a perennial issue in the field of communication, which started in the era of 
postal services and continues to the present era of broadband networks. As infrastructures, or large-
scale systems, information and communication technologies (ICTs) are central to citizens’ political, 
economic, and social lives. Historically and today, a variety of factors such as political and regulatory 
decisions impact access to infrastructure. Current concerns about equitable access include the network 
neutrality. 
Keywords: access, communication and public policy, history of media and communications, information 
and communication technology, media convergence, media law and policy, media regulation. 
 
Main Text 
Access to infrastructure is the means as well as the opportunity to use the basic physical and 
organizational structures required for the operation of society. Infrastructures are the large-scale public 
systems, services, and facilities of a country or region that are necessary for commerce and social 
activity. All businesses and individuals depend on them to participate in all aspects of social, economic, 
cultural, and political life. Traditionally, states have provided infrastructures or regulated them heavily 
due to their central role in economic and social functions. There are several reasons for this: people, 
businesses, and governments all rely on infrastructures; they have significant externalities or indirect 
effects on activity; and they require large capital investments. States created government-owned postal, 
telegraph, and telephone monopolies to ensure access to infrastructure for their populations. 
Additionally, governments built infrastructure such as railways, currencies, and electrical systems. In 
cases such as the United States where the government did not choose to have a state monopoly over 
communications infrastructure, corporations historically built and maintained infrastructures and 
provided them on a monopoly basis and in return, the state has required them to fulfill public service 
obligations.  
There are several dimensions of access to infrastructure in communication and information technologies 
(ICTs). These include physical access to the infrastructure, regulation of the infrastructure, ability to 
access end user services, access to equipment with which to use the infrastructure and/or service, 
digital literacy skills or the capacity to use the technology, access to content, and access to governance 
or the ability to have a say in decision-making around the ICTs (Gillett, 2000; Clement & Shade, 2000). 
Geographical factors as well as socio-cultural factors, such as age, (dis)ability, and gender also impact 
access to, and use of, information and communication technologies. Access to infrastructure concerns 
two groups, those desiring access for the purpose of sending information and those needing access for 
the purpose of receiving informational content.  
In communications, governments historically have separated access to infrastructure and associated 
policy making into two distinct groups, telecommunications and broadcasting, which have received 
different treatment. A central issue, discussed below, is the crumbling of the distinctions between these 
separate spheres, which impacts access to infrastructure in the digital era. In the following, access to 
infrastructure is decoupled from content and end user services, such as the internet, which are beyond 
the scope of this piece. The central focus will be on physical access to infrastructure by senders of 
information and the laws, policies, and regulations that influence this access. 
 
HISTORY OF ACCESS TO INFRASTRUCTURE 
Postal Systems 
Postal monopolies were the first centralized network systems in communication. Postal systems in 
Europe originated in the early 16th century in the Hapsburg Empire, where monarchs granted exclusives 
privileges to private companies. Later postal systems became state-run monopolies. At first, postal 
systems catered exclusively to official state and military communications and were transmitted over a 
limited range (Starr, 2004; Noam, 1987). In the early 1600s both France and Britain opened their postal 
systems to the public. Although Britain’s Royal Mail opened to the public in 1635, it was a non-uniform 
system that was expensive to use. The Royal Mail adopted postal reforms in 1840 that featured a 
uniform rate of one penny for mail under one half an ounce regardless of the distance the letter 
traveled within the country. The rate reform greatly increased the volume of mail sent through the 
Royal Mail.  
In the 1600s, the British post interconnected to the continental network. International postal services 
were a complex problem and became more so in the mid-1800s when improvements allowed for more 
rapid transportation and demand grew. In the early 1860s, delegates from the European and United 
States postal services met to simplify procedures for transmitting mail between systems. Work 
continued for over a decade and in 1875, the group established the General Postal Union, the precursor 
to the Universal Postal Union (1878) governed by the Universal Postal Convention. The body became an 
agency of the United Nations in 1948. 
Postal systems are common carriers, they carry letters, newspapers, periodicals, and parcels without 
discrimination at just and reasonable rates. As state-owned monopolies, however, at times authorities 
used the postal system to surveil opponents and censor contentious material. For example, in 1835 in 
the U.S. state of South Carolina, U.S. postal officials removed abolitionist newspapers from the mail 
despite having sworn an oath to expeditiously transmit all mail without discrimination (John, 1995). 
Thus, postal services have not always upheld their obligations as common carriers. 
The post office operated as a central government department and the Postmaster General sat in the 
Cabinet, the decision-making body of the British government’s executive branch. In the 1960s, the 
government considered converting the post office into a nationalized industry. In 1969, the Post Office 
Act passed and in October of that year, the Post Office department became the Post Office Corporation. 
The Royal Mail endured a privatization attempt between the 1980s and early 1990s, but the government 
decided against the change. In October of 2013, however, the government sold sixty percent of the 
Royal Mail in a public offering in an effort to increase the system’s competitiveness and its access to 
private capital.  
 
Telegraphy and Telephony 
The electric telegraph entered the communication scene in the 1840s and the telephone over thirty 
years later in the 1870s. For nearly a century, traditional telegraphy and telephony were centralized 
network systems operated by a monopolist. In most of the world, the operator was a government 
administration, commonly called a post, telegraph, and telephone (PTT) authority. In Britain, private 
companies originally provided electrical telegraph service. The British government nationalized the 
telegraph in 1870 in response to business and press anger over increased rates levied by the private 
telegraph companies and it became a part of the British Post Office. The post office slashed rates and 
operated the telegraph as a social utility which vastly increased the number of messages the telegraph 
system handled, but this program eventually retarded the growth of telephony due to system deficits 
accrued from low telegraph rates (Hochfelder, 2000). In contrast, in the United States and Canada, 
private companies operated the centralized network system with the approval and oversight of 
government regulators. 
A foundational concept to access to centralized network systems, the common carriage principle, has a 
long history. Originally developed in English common law to regulate overland carriers, legislators 
adopted the principle into telegraph and telephone policy. As common carriers, telephone and 
telegraph companies had to allow fair and equitable access to the means of transmission at prices that 
were both just and reasonable. Common carriers in the transportation realm were liable for the goods 
they transported. Telecommunications providers, in contrast, had only limited liability for messages 
sent.   
The first requirement of common carriage, that common carriers had to provide non-discriminatory 
access to the telegraph and telephone lines, meant that the companies could not refuse to transmit 
messages due to the content of the message nor the identity of the sender. Additionally, an important 
outcome of common carriers’ obligation to provide non-discriminatory access to their services meant 
they had to interconnect their lines with those of other carriers, including competitors. As such, a 
company could not refuse to send messages to connecting lines, even when operated by competitors 
(Horwitz, 1989). This requirement is important because it meant that telecommunication companies did 
not have editorial control over the messages they transmitted. To ensure telegraph and telephone 
companies faced no conflicts in this matter, governments and regulators viewed telecommunication 
companies as conduits and forbade them from owning or investing in content. The second requirement 
of common carriage is that common carriers had to provide access at just and reasonable prices.  
Most European countries, including Austria, France, the German Empire, and Switzerland viewed the 
telephone as an extension of their postal-telegraph monopolies and most had nationalized the provision 
of telephony by 1900. In Britain, telephony was introduced in 1870 with the General Post Office 
providing the trunk lines, or those running between cities, and private companies providing local service. 
In 1912, however, Britain nationalized the local telephone lines creating a public monopoly operating 
under the purview of the post office. When the post office became a corporation, telecommunications 
remained under the post office. The telecommunications arm of the post office, Post Office 
Telecommunications, was renamed British Telecom in 1980.  
The British Telecommunications Act of 1981 changed the structure of telephony in Britain. First, the act 
separated British Telecom from the Post Office and it became a corporation on its own. Additionally, the 
act introduced competition into the UK telecommunications industry. The Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry became responsible to license operators to establish telecommunications systems. Also, 
the Secretary of State worked on standards for third party telecommunications equipment and required 
BT to connect approved devices to its network. The following year, the Secretary of State licensed Cable 
& Wireless, a multinational telecommunications company based in the UK, to provide domestic 
telecommunications through a subsidiary, Mercury Communications. These changes are called 
liberalization, the process of opening up a market to competition. 
Following the liberalization of the telecommunications market, the government started to privatize 
British Telecom, by selling over half of the company’s shares to private investors. The 
Telecommunications Act of 1984 provided the legislative consent for the privatization and that same 
year, the government sold shares to the public. In 1991 and 1993, the government sold its remaining 
shares in the company. In the liberalized market, British Telecom no longer had a monopoly and it had 
to secure a license like other telecommunications providers. In 1991, government policy changed to 
further open telecommunications and allow for competing providers.  
Following the privatization of British Telecom, the government created a regulator, the Office of 
Telecommunications (Oftel), to regulate competition. In late 2000, Oftel required BT to provide local 
loop unbundling, allowing competing telecommunications firms to use BT’s infrastructure. The Office of 
Communications (Ofcom) replaced Oftel following the Communications Act of 2003. The act changed 
the way telecommunications were regulated and outlined conditions to offset the substantial market 
power of dominant telecommunications carriers which could include the requirement to interconnect 
with other network operators, be non-discriminatory, and submit to price controls. BT retains its 
universal service obligations for the United Kingdom which include connecting customers to the wired 
telephone network, providing for customers with special social needs, and providing public telephones. 
 
Radio Broadcasting 
Access to radio and television broadcasting infrastructure differs substantially from access to 
telecommunications. While telegraph and telephone companies are common carriers, broadcasters 
operate on a contract carriage system where they allow access to their networks on a discretionary 
basis. They are permitted editorial control; broadcasters choose which content to air and which to 
decline. Broadcasters negotiate private contracts with content providers, and can charge different 
programmers different amounts for access. Radio and television have barriers to access to the 
infrastructure due to the high cost of establishing a traditional radio or television station and the policies 
and regulations in place restricting which entities could broadcast. 
Radio in Britain began with wireless telegraphy. In 1904, the government passed the Wireless 
Telegraphy Act, requiring wireless transmitting stations and receivers to have a license from the Post 
Office. British broadcasting began with a handful of amateur broadcasters but the General Post Office 
closed these stations and sought to limit broadcasting to two entities, despite interest from several 
more. To determine the structure of radio broadcasting, in 1921, officials from the Post Office met with 
radio manufacturers. The result of the meetings was the creation of one manufacturer-owned 
corporation that was owned by the manufacturers, the British Broadcasting Company (BBCo). By late 
1922, the BBCo broadcast from London, Manchester, Birmingham, and Newcastle. The company 
received a two-year license from the Post Office in 1923. The Post Office charged a license fee on radio 
receivers which provided funding for broadcasting operations. As the BBCo broadcast, committees were 
charged to investigate the future form of radio broadcasting in Britain. As a result of these committees, 
in 1927 the BBCo became a public corporation, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), with a royal 
charter to be operated on a principle of public service (Starr, 2004; Winston, 1998). The BBC was to be 
independent of government control, although the Post Office retained control over broadcasting hours, 
wavelengths, and the power of the stations. The BBC had to fulfill certain public service obligations, 
including the requirement that it inform, educate, and entertain the public. A board of governors 
oversaw the public broadcaster. 
At the BBC, officials believed broadcasting had a cultural, moral, and educational role to improve British 
subjects. Before 1996, officials at the BBC debated about what types of programming should be aired 
and decided which programs to commission. Programs were produced in house at the BBC and 
producers competed amongst each other for commissions. After 1996, broadcasting and production 
separated and the broadcasting arm could commission program ideas from independent producers. 
Unlike telegraph and telephone systems, broadcasters played an active role in selecting and creating the 
content flowing over the airwaves. The vast majority of countries operated broadcasting as a state 
monopoly until late in the twentieth century. 
The content provided by public broadcasters did not satisfy all listeners. To fulfill unmet listener tastes, 
unlicensed broadcasters cropped up to provide different content to listeners. These so-called “pirate” 
radio stations were difficult for authorities to control. To work around the UK’s state monopoly on 
broadcasting, “pirate” radio stations, operated from ships or barges off-shore and outside of territorial 
waters. These stations provided an alternative to the BBC during the 1960s and 1970s. Primarily, pirate 
stations in Britain broadcast popular rock music using the American, disc-jockey format that the state 
broadcaster did not provide. Additionally, the high-power station Radio Luxembourg broadcast popular 
music into the United Kingdom, interfering with the BBC’s broadcast monopoly. 
The BBC had a radio monopoly in the United Kingdom until the 1970s when the government permitted 
independent local radio stations. The first of these, the London Broadcasting Company (LBC) began 
broadcasting in 1973. The advertising-supported, independent local stations were meant to supply the 
programming that youth audiences sought. In the mid-1980s, the independent local stations became 
akin to commercial radio stations, prioritizing profits over local public service. A decade later, 
independent radio stations in Britain had become consolidated and owned by a few companies that 
abandoned the production of local content and provided narrow genre formats to listeners (Stoller, 
2010). 
 
Television Broadcasting 
Terrestrial television broadcasting began in Britain as a public experimental service in the late 1930s, 
only to be interrupted by lack of interest as well as the outbreak of World War II. Television 
broadcasting began again in the post-war period starting with one transmitter in London. In 1952, the 
BBC built a network of transmitters capable of reaching nearly 80 percent of the population. At this 
time, there was only a single television channel.  
The Broadcasting Act of 1954 permitted the establishment of commercial television. In 1955, 
“Independent Television” or ITV launched, a network of independent, regional broadcasters providing 
television services to compete with the BBC’s offerings. In addition, the Act created the Independent 
Television Authority (ITA) to regulate the commercial broadcasters. The ITA owned and operated the 
television transmitters and provided regional franchises to companies that created the content. Like the 
BBC, the independent broadcasters had to entertain, educate, and inform audiences.  The government, 
responding to the competitive pressures on the BBC brought on by ITV, provided the BBC with a second 
television channel, BBC-2, in 1964. This channel was to provide programming with popular appeal 
(Crisell, 2005). A fourth television channel dedicated to special interest content, Channel 4, began in 
1982.  
 
Cable and Satellite Television 
In the UK, cable and satellite television providers joined the television landscape during the 1990s. This 
was a period of neo-liberalism, a doctrine that favored market forces as regulation and valued increased 
consumer choice. The 1990 Broadcasting Act, based on this ideology, did not outline regulations for 
cable and satellite television. Instead, the government left the regulation of these broadcasters to the 
market place. In the UK, cable systems were slow to develop as investors did not fund them. By 1988, 
cable systems were only available to 300,000 homes across the UK and only a fraction of these homes 
subscribed. 
In 1977, the World Radio Administrative Conference allotted the UK five digital television channels. 
Originally, the BBC planned to use the channels but was unable to secure adequate funding for the 
venture. Therefore, the BBC withdrew. In 1986, the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) asked for 
a commercial venture that wanted to use the digital channels, would follow public service mandates, 
and be on the air before 1990. The IBA awarded the contract to British Satellite Broadcasting (BSB), a 
consortia. The transmission technology BSB was required to use delayed the launch of the service. In 
1989, before the technology issue was sorted, the Australian media owner Rupert Murdoch launched 
Sky satellite television. Sky used the Luxembourg Astra satellite and ignored rules about the required 
transmission technology, using a less-expensive and immediately available device. The UK government 
did not stop Murdoch’s venture. By providing service before the IBA-selected BSB, Sky had the first to 
market advantage and amassed subscribers, eventually merging with BSB to become BSkyB. This 
provider quickly became dominant in the analog satellite market (Smith, 1999). 
BSkyB’s dominance in the analog satellite market led the Independent Television Commission to utilize 
economic regulations to ensure that the company’s dominance in one market did not mean it would use 
its power to become dominant in digital television. BSkyB’s customers had set top boxes, or decoders, 
that would give them conditional access to the television signals they paid to receive. As the dominant 
company, BSkyB had advantages in the pay television market because its customers already had its set 
top boxes and would not likely change the company they subscribed to or purchase a second set top 
box. To constrain these first mover advantages, European Union regulations on cable and satellite 
system owners, the Advanced Television Services Directive of 1995, calls for access to digital encryption 
services to be proved on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms to third party broadcasters and 
requires member countries to ensure this occurs. Two years later, the UK government acted to 
implement the EU directive. At central issue was which body would regulate oversee interconnection of 
competitors to conditional access systems, Oftel, the telecommunications regulator or ITC, the 
broadcast regulator. The government eventually chose to regulate conditional access systems as 
telecommunications, and put them under the purview of Oftel. 
 
ACCESS TO BROADBAND INFRASTRUCTURE 
In the past, governments operated and regulated telecommunications and broadcasting systems 
separately. As outlined above, historically telephone companies operated as common carriers and 
broadcasters were permitted editorial control over the messages transmitted. These separate systems, 
however, converged. Traditional communications systems and media were analog; whereas currently 
text, audio, and visual materials are created, stored, and transmitted in digital formats. Viewing 
digitization as a means to more efficiently provide services to consumers, telephone and cable providers 
digitized their services. The internet also allows people to create, transmit, and store text, audio and 
visual materials digitally. Digital technology has led to the convergence of the formerly separate systems 
of telecommunications, television, cable, and computing technologies. Technological convergence was 
assisted by philosophical changes by governments around the world, which transitioned from favoring 
traditional state monopoly carriers to systems regulated by competition. The era of liberalization which 
began in the 1970s favored competition and governments and regulators began to desire previously 
separate systems, such as the telephone and cable systems, to compete with each other in the provision 
of telephone and television services. The current communications environment includes incumbents 
with legacy networks, new competitors, and plans to upgrade infrastructure to next generation 
networks. While communications systems historically provided vertically distinct, single services through 
one infrastructure, the internet protocol can provide voice, data, and video over any physical network 
infrastructure. This change leads to horizontal, multi-service, and converged markets for 
telecommunications. 
Questions around broadband and next-generation networks center on what is commonly called network 
neutrality. While there are multiple definitions of the term, in general, the concern is that broadband 
providers might discriminate in favor of some applications, such as those they own or have a financial 
interest in, or they may slow traffic to sites that do not pay for higher service tiers without regulation to 
rein in such anti-competitive behavior (Wallsten & Hausladen, 2009). The basic concern of network 
neutrality is the providers will favor or discriminate against particular network content. To cope with the 
rapidly changing communications environment, governments have used three different forms of 
regulation: structural separation, access regulation, and unregulated competition (Kirsch & von 
Hirschhausen, 2008).  
Network Neutrality and Competition in the United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom is using structural separation to regulate advanced telecommunications. In 2005, 
Ofcom released the Telecommunications Strategic Review outlining new regulatory directions for the 
telecommunications sector in the UK. Information services in the UK rely on BT’s copper wire legacy 
network. The review found bottlenecks to competition within this fixed telecommunications system, 
specifically the supply of wholesale access and backhaul network services, and called for strategies to 
promote competition between competing infrastructures. Ofcom, however, realized that competitors 
had to rely on BT for network access where competition was unsustainable. To overcome this problem, 
Ofcom adopted an equality of access approach meaning that BT had to make access to the network 
available to competitors on the same terms access was available to BT itself (Ofcom, 2005). To 
implement equality of access, Ofcom selected structural separation as the regulatory choice for ensuring 
non-discrimination. In response, BT created Openreach, a separate access services division, to manage 
the UK’s telecommunications infrastructure. Openreach treats BT’s retail and wholesale businesses the 
same as other operators desiring access to the infrastructure.  
In the United Kingdom, net neutrality became an issue in 2007 when the BBC released the iPlayer, a 
service that allows people to watch BBC programming online for seven days after its original broadcast 
date. Internet service providers (ISPs) in the UK worried that the potential popularity of the iPlayer 
would overwhelm networks and decrease the quality of service that all ISP users received. As such 
internet service providers complained that the BBC was offloading its distribution costs onto the ISPs 
and they demanded that the BBC pay for costs imposed on the network due to the bandwidth 
requirements of the service. They threatened to throttle, or slow down, traffic from the iPlayer to 
customers’ devices if the BBC did not help to offset the costs for network upgrades. In response, the BBC 
installed additional servers around the UK to help manage the traffic. Despite the row over the BBC’s 
iPlayer, the UK government rejected creating network neutrality legislation in its 2009 report “Digital 
Britain” and noted that they would not prohibit network traffic management except in cases where it is 
used in an anti-competitive manner. 
Network Neutrality in the United States 
In the United States, the national regulatory body, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
regulates telecommunications services as common carriers whereas information services that provide 
and manage information, such as cable, DSL, and broadband, are not common carriers and remain 
unregulated. This distinction has played a central role in the network neutrality debate in the United 
States as information services wish to exercise editorial control, as in the older model of broadcasting 
regulation, rather than provide non-discriminatory access. The Internet Protocol (IP) was designed to 
use the end to end principle. It can operate on a variety of physical communications infrastructures and 
can serve different applications. As a result of these technical characteristics, some people view the 
internet as non-discriminatory. This perspective comes into direct conflict with the desire of information 
services to be able to block and prioritize web traffic; charge bandwidth-intensive content providers for 
better service (enabling information services to pay for upgrades to handle the requests for service); and 
charge different content providers different prices for service (Hart, 2011). Each of these tactics is 
discriminatory in that they create different quality grades for internet service, use price discrimination, 
and block or slow access to particular websites.  
Although the FCC does not impose common carrier obligations on information services, it created open 
internet rules in 2010. Cable, DSL, and broadband providers fought against the rules whereas 
information providers favored them. The FCC’s ability to impose open access rules on information 
services was questioned in court. In January of 2014, the U.S. federal appeals court for the District of 
Columbia struck down the FCC’s open internet rules because the Commission is not allowed to impose 
what amounted to common carrier rules on information services. If the U.S. government wants to 
implement network neutrality rules, it will need to pass new legislation to reclassify information services 
as common carriers thus requiring them to provide access to all services without discrimination. 
Access Regulation in the Republic of Korea 
The third form of regulation used by national regulators to promote net neutrality is access regulation. 
South Korea uses this approach. South Korea is a worldwide leader of broadband provision. The 
government has played a central role in the expansion of advanced telecommunications and its 
involvement in broadband has led to near universal service. Between 1995 and 2000, the government 
funded the South Korean Information Infrastructure Project (KII) that constructed a national high-speed 
transmission network. South Korea has infrastructure competition, with cable, fiber, and DSL providing 
broadband services. The incumbent, KT (formerly Korea Telecomm) that the government privatized in 
2002 has significant market power and it captures half of the broadband market. Competitors SK 
Broadband (formerly Hanaro Telecom) and LG U+ also provide broadband services. Cable providers also 
offer competition although originally the Korean government did not allow cable providers to provide 
broadband. Rather, internet providers leased space on the cable networks. Korean regulators require 
networks to provide open access for competitors to bottleneck facilities. 
Open Access and the Alberta, Canada, SuperNet 
One notable regional project which reverses the trend of the privatization of infrastructure is the 
Government of Alberta, Canada’s Alberta SuperNet. The SuperNet is a fiber optic infrastructure built as 
a public-private partnership between the Government of Alberta, the telecommunications company 
Bell, and a network manager, Axia. Bell owns and operates the fiber within the province’s major cities 
while the government owns the extended network, the parts of the network outside of the cities. The 
extended network is managed by a private company, Axia, which provides open access to the 
broadband infrastructure. Connectivity to the SuperNet is available at uniform rates to any service; a 
guaranteed megabit per second for $50 Canadian per month. As the manager, Axia is prohibited from 
offering retail services on the network. As such, Axia does not have an interest in keeping any service off 
of the network; instead, it reaps more revenue the more services are on the network. The provincial 
government’s original intent was to encourage competitive access to service providers within the 
extended region. Such competition has been slow to emerge due to the economic realities of providing 
services to regions with low population densities. 
Access to broadband infrastructure is an issue of great import to telecommunications regulation. 
Choices made at the political and regulatory level influence providers’ ability to transmit information as 
well as citizens’ ability to access it.  
SEE ALSO: Access to content; digital divide(s); ICT4D and global connectivity; ICT4D and local access; 
internet governance; network neutrality; technology and the law. 
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